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FAR-REACHING EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACTS AND THE GROWTH
OF FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW
ROBERT J. MALLEY*

The attention of the securities bar increasingly has been drawn to
the efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission to pursue novel
forms of ancillary relief in civil injunctive actions brought against
issuers of securities. These efforts reached a high-water mark in
proceedings instituted against Mattel, Inc.,' in which the Commission
obtained a consent order providing for the appointment to Mattel's board
of directors of an independent majority of members satisfactory to
the Commission and approved by the court. As was to be expected,
this sweeping relief did not pass unnoticed; public comments generally
examined the possibility of encroachment by the Commission upon
the rights of Mattel's shareholders to elect the company's directors and
the efficacy of the remedy to prevent the filing of erroneous financial
2
reports in the future.
This article will examine the relief obtained by the Commission in
the proceedings against Mattel in light of principles which traditionally
have been used by the courts to grant or deny requests for ancillary
relief in equitable proceedings, and in relation to previous Commission
enforcement actions. It will also explore the question of whether the
order obtained by the Commission presents a further growth of "federal corporate law" in preemption of state law.

The Mattel Proceedings
In the initial action brought against Mattel, the Commission's complaint alleged that the toy manufacturer had filed false and misleading
financial statements with the Commission in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19 34 ,3 and that Mattel had issued false and misleading
* B.A., Colgate University; J.D., Columbia University. Alember, New York State Bar.
1. SEC-v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,754
(D.D.C. 1974) (initial complaint and injunction); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RF:P. 4; 94,807 (D.D.C. 1974) (application for further relief).
2. See, e.g., BusiNESS WEEK, Oct. 12, 1974, at 32; Matthews, SEC's Won-Lost Mark
in '74 Seen Good on Balance, in Special Report: SEC '75, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1974, at

col. 4.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1970).
[47 ]
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press releases concerning the results of its operations. The court permanently enjoined Mattel from violating the antifraud and corporate
reporting provisions of the Exchange Act 4 and ordered .the corporation to appoint two additional directors who would be unaffiliated
with Mattel and satisfactory to the Commission. The court further
ordered Mattel to establish a financial controls and audit committee
of four directors to review Mattel's accounting procedures and controls, financial reports, and press releases. In addition, the corporation
was required to establish a litigation and claims committee of three
directors to determine what action should be taken with respect to
claims against officers, directors, and employees of Mattel and to
approve the settlement of these claims.'
After entry of this order, but before implementation of the required
ancillary relief, Mattel advised the Commission of certain additional
information of a preliminary nature, subject to verification and possible
modification. The Commission interpreted this data to indicate that
Mattel's financial statements for two additional previous fiscal years
and for certain interim reporting periods during one of these years had
materially misstated Mattel's financial condition' and the results of
operations for these periods, and further, that the financial statements of
Mattel for prior and subsequent periods also might have been affected.
Based upon this preliminary information, which the Commission viewed
as requiring "additional relief for the protection of investors," ' the
Commission filed an application for further relief with the District Court
for the District of Columbia on October 1, 1974.
In the second proceeding the court noted that it retained jurisdiction
to implement the terms of the decree entered in the first proceeding and
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, m, n (1970).
5. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.

L. RE. TJ94,754
(D.D.C. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Mattel 1].
6. The Commission's application stated that Mattel's financial statements for the fiscal
year ending January 30, 1971, substantially overstated sales, net income, and accounts
receivable. Included on the sales overstatement were approximately S14,000,000 in purported sales which were subject to customer cancellation. The Commission also alleged
that adequate adjustments for tooling and inventory obsolescence were not made, resulting in the overstatement of pretax income by as much as $10,500,000. These inadequate
provisions apparently resulted in a material overstatement of Mattel's losses for the
fiscal year ending January 29, 1972. The preliminary information received by the Commission further indicated that a $4,800,000 sale had been incorrectly reflected twice in
the issuer's published financial statements. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,807, at 96,689 (D.D.C. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Mattel II].
7. Id. at 96,690.
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"all additional decrees or orders appropriate in the public interest or
for the protectio.i of investors and to grant such other and further relief
as .. . required at law or in equity as requested by either party.
• . .")s Accordingly, based upon the Commission's application and
Mattel's consent 9 the court filed an amended judgment and order which
superseded its order entered in Mattel I. In addition to continuing the
permanent injunction against Mattel relating to the antifraud and reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, the amended judgment and
order required Mattel to appoint to, and maintain on, its board of directors additional, unaffiliated, directors sufficient in number to constitute
a majority of the board. Such additional directors and all replacements
were to be "satisfactory" to both the Commission and Mattel and were
to be approved by the court prior to taking office.1"
Under the amended order, Mattel was further required to maintain
an executive committee of the board of directors composed of three or
more members, the majority of whom at all times would be unaffiliated directors." Two additional committees were ordered to be established and maintained. As provided in the first proceeding, a financial
controls and audit committee of the board was to hold broad powers
relating to Mattel's financial, accounting, and reporting activities. Three
independent directors were to exercise all voting power on matters before the committee; a fourth member, who was permitted to be a Mattel
designee, was without voting rights.12 A litigation and claims committee,
consisting of three unaffiliated directors, was to be vested with broad
authority in the area of both pending litigation and possible claims
which Mattel might have against any of its past or present directors,
officers, employees, or controlling persons. This committee was to have
the power to commence, settle, or dispose of any such litigation or
claims.'

3

The new unaffiliated directors were to appoint a special counsel, satisfactory to the Commission and approved by the court, to investigate
matters raised by the Commission's complaint and application. The special counsel was required to file a report with the court of his findings
8. Id. at 96,692.

9. Mattel's consent was solely for the purpose of the Commission's proceedings; it did
not constitute an admission of any of the allegations contained in the Commission's
complaint or application. id. at 96,692.
10. Id. at 96,693.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 96,694.
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and recommendations and, as approved by the new directors, to institute actions on behalf of the company against past or present officers,
directors, and others.' 4 The special counsel was in turn required to
retain a special auditor, satisfactory to Mattel, the Commission, and
the court, to audit Mattel's defective 1971 and 1972 financial statements
and other statements as requested, and to file within four months an
auditor's report with the court and the Commission.'"
In addition to the broad scope of the relief ordered, the court's
amended judgment and order provided that certain provisions thereof,
including those relating to the appointment of the new Mattel directors,
the three committees, and the special counsel, would continue in effect
for a period of five years from the date of entry, or for such shorter
or longer period as the court, upon application of a party, should
decree. 6
Statutory Framework
Section 21(e) of the Exchange Act empowers the Commission to
bring an action for injunctive relief when it appears that any person
"is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions" of that Act or of
7
any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder by the Commission.'
Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 193318 corresponds in all material respects to section 21(e) of the Exchange Act. Under both
statutes, a permanent or temporary injunction or a restraining order
will be granted "upon a proper showing." Although neither section
14. Id.
15. Id. at 96,695.
16. Id. at 96,696.
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). Section 17
of S.249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), the Senate version of the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, would have added the words "has engaged" to the present statutory
language "is engaged or is about to engage in . . . a violation" and would have changed
the term "proper showing" to "such showing." No such changes were proposed in the
companion House bill, H.R. 4111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). These proposed amendments were strongly criticized by leading members of the securities bar on the ground
that such changes would deprive the federal courts of their "traditional discretion!' to
decide whether an injunction were actually required to prevent future violations of
law, which would be contrary to our concept of separation of powers. Letter from
Kenneth Bialkin, Arthur Mathews, Milton Freeman, William Painter, & Manuel Cohen
to the Senate and House Conferees on S.249, May 12, 1975. In the conference which
considered the differing House and Senate bills, these changes were not adopted. See
H.R. REP. No. 299, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970).
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expressly authorizes the Commission to seek ancillary relief in civil injunctive actions, it is clearly established that the Commission may obtain
the appointment of a receiver in appropriate circumstances. 9 Such
ancillary relief flows from the inherent power of a court of equity to

do justice and grant full relief,20 and the need for its exercise is to be
21
determined by the facts of each case.
Pursuant to the exercise of such inherent power, receivers have fre-

quently been appointed by courts in situations in which an issuer was
insolvent 22 and in which investors were threatened with continued
injury arising out of the unlawful acts of a broker-dealer.23 In each
instance, however, the motivation underlying such an appointment
was to preserve and maintain the status quo in order that necessary

steps could be taken to provide relief to those who had been damaged
or threatened with injury as a result of the defendant's unlawful
activity. 24 In one case arising under the Investment Company Act of
194021 receivers were appointed to take charge of an investment trust

and given power to either reorganize its capital structure or liquidate
the trust.26 This appointment, however, followed a finding by the
court that all but one of the trust's officers and directors had been

guilty of a "gross abuse of trust"

27

within the meaning of section 36

19. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Center, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Bawler, 427 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1970); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.
1966); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). See notes 22-24 infra & accompanying text.
20. [Als the Supreme Court has stated with respect to other regulatory statutes,
[we conclude with respect to section 20(b) of. the Securities Act and by
implication section 21 (e) of the Exchange Act] that the Congress must be
taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide
complete relief in the light of the statutory purposes.
Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 182 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961). Cf. Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 261 (1st
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946).
21. See Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 181 (9th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
22. E.g., id.; SEC v. H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
23. E.g., SEC v. H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); see III L.
Loss, SECURMEs REGULATION 1508-14 (2d ed. 1961).
24. See Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 181 (9th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp.
432,433 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
25. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -51 (1970).
26. Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795
(1946).
27. Id. at 261.
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of the Investment Company Act,28 which resulted in an order enjoining
such persons from continuing to serve as officers and trustees of the
investment trust. Inasmuch as section 36 expressly requires the injunctive relief granted in that case,29 it is-clear that the appointment
of receivers empowered to function as directors or officers of investment companies is not dependent upon a court's inherent powers, but
finds authorization in the express language of the statute. Neither
section 21 (e) of the Exchange Act nor section 20(b) of the Securities
Act contains an analogous statutory requirement; under these Acts,
therefore, the appointment of officers or directors is dependent entirely
upon the court's inherent equity powers.
Previous Commission Enforcement Actions
Commencing in 1973, the Securities and Exchange Commission began
to pursue a more imaginative approach to consent settlements of civil
injunctive proceedings brought against issuers under the various securities Acts. Although the Commission has not abandoned requests for the
appointment of an equity receiver, 30 it has more frequently requested
that additional members, independent of the defendant issuer, be appointed to its board of directors, a ' that certain committees of the board
of directors be established, 32 or that an independent special counsel
28. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).

29. Under the Investment Company Act, if allegations of a breach of fiduciary duty
by the directors or officers of a registered investment company are established, such
persons may be enjoined from continuing to act in an official capacity. 15 U.S.C. §
80a-35(a) (1970).
30. SEC Litigation Release No. 6518 (Sept. 16, 1974) (SEC v. National Farmers Org.
(S.D. Iowa 1974)); SEC Litigation Release No. 6512 (Sept. 17, 1974) (SEC v. United
States Tank Car Corp. (N.D. Cal. 1974)).
31. SEC Litigation Release No. 6540 (Oct. 9, 1974) (SEC v. Seaboard Corp. (C.D.
Cal. 1974)) (two new directors appointed); SEC Litigation Release No. 6441 (July 18,
1974) (SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. 1974)) (board of directors to be reconstituted so that outside independent directors constitute 40 percent of the directorate);

SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (Sept. 12, 1973)

(SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp.

(S.D. Tex. 1973)) (board of directors increased from 10 to 13 members, with 6 new
directors to be elected); SEC Litigation Release No. 6142 (Nov. 9, 1973) (SEC v.
Westgate-California Corp. (S.D. Cal. 1973)) (board of directors reconstituted to seven,
five to be appointed by the court).
32. SEC Litigation Release No. 6670 (Jan. 8, 1975) (SEC v. Alleghany Beverage Corp.

(D.D.C. 1975)) (independent audit committee to be established composed of unaffiliated
persons acceptable to the Commission and corporation and approved by the court);
SEC Litigation Release No. 6142 (Nov. 9, 1973)

(SEC v. Westgate-California Corp.

(S.D. Cal. 1973)) (executive committee to be established); SEC Litigation Release No.
6054 (Sept. 12, 1973)

(SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp. (S.D. Tex. 1973))

(executive
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under court supervision be appointed to pursue, on behalf of the issuer's
shareholders, possible causes of action against third persons, directors,
or officers of the issuer.33 In addition, the Commission was successful
in obtaining as ancillary relief in a civil injunctive proceeding the
appointment of an unaffiliated majority of directors on two occasions
prior to its proceedings against M'attel,34 and, in another case, requested
that a shareholders' meeting be called for the purpose of voting upon
35
the continuation of the company's management.
Because the appointment of receivers has generally been based upon
the need to maintain the status quo until relief can be afforded to persons who have been damaged by violations of the securities laws,36
it must be determined why the appointment of additional directors,
perhaps constituting a majority of a company's board of directors, is
thought to be necessary in situations in which the Commission seeks
an injunction against continued violations of the Exchange Act. In
Mattel I, Mattel 11, and other cases in which the Commission has obtained the appointment of additional directors to a company's board
of directors 3 T or the establishment of new directors' committees, 38 the
Commission appears to be concerned as much with the issuer's future
conduct as with its past behavior. 39 Indeed, in announcing the issuance
committee, with its own independent legal counsel and independent audit committee to
be established); SEC Litigation Release No. 6441 (July 18, 1974) (SEC v. Canadian
Javelin, Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. 1974)) (compliance committee, a majority of whose members
to consist of independent outside directors, to be established).
33. SEC Litigation Release No. 6142 (Nov. 9, 1973) (SEC v. Westgate-California
Corp. (S.D. Cal. 1973)); SEC Litigation Release No. 6441 (July 18, 1974) (SEC v.
Canadian Javelin, Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. 1974)); SEC Litigation Release No. 6593 (Nov. 21,
1974) (SEC v. Charter Sec. Mgmt. Corp. (C.D. Cal. 1974)); SEC Litigation Release No.
6540 (Oct. 9, 1974) (SEC v. Seaboard Corp. (C.D. Cal. 1974)).
34. SEC Litigation Release No. 6593 (Nov. 21, 1974) (SEC v. Charter Sec. Mgmt. Corp.
(C.D. Cal. 1974)); SEC Litigation Release No. 6142 (Nov. 9, 1973) (SEC v. WestgateCalifornia Corp. (S.D. Cal. 1973)).
35. SEC Litigation Release No. 6582 (Nov. 12, 1974) (SEC v. Readex Elec., Inc.
(W.D.N.Y. 1974)) (injunction proceeding in which the corporate and individual
defendants were alleged to have violated, and to have aided and abetted violations of,
sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c) (Supp. 1, 1971)).
36. See notes 22-24 supra & accompanying text.
37. See note 31 supra & accompanying text.
38. See note 32 supra & accompanying text.
39. If. the Commission had desired to maintain the status quo and grant relief to those
damaged by the past violations, it could have appointed a person or persons, unaffiliated
with Mattel, to prepare corrected financial statements and reports covering the periods
in question. These financial statements and reports Eould have been filed with the Commission and, to the extent required by the Exchange Act or the. court, sent to Mattel's
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of the court's order in Mattel I, the Commission expressly acknowledged
that the two committees which were ordered to be established were
"calculated to avoid a repetition of the alleged violations" of the
antifraud and reporting provisions of the Exchange Act. 40 Presumably, this rationale also supported the Commission's request for the
even broader ancillary relief sought in Mattel I. The Commission
thus appears to have reinterpreted the scope of the court's inherent
equity powers under the Exchange Act and the Securities Act to include not only remedial maintenance of the status quo, but also extensive
regulation of future operations.

The Standard of Necessity
Notwithstanding any question concerning the validity of this apparent
reinterpretation of the scope of the court's power under the securities
Acts, it remains well established that the exercise of the equity power,
whatever its breadth, depends upon the necessity in a given case.41 At
issue in applications of such sweeping remedies as those imposed in
Mattel II is whether the relevant standard of necessity has been met.
Unfortunately, because the proceeding against Mattel culminated in the
entry of an order to which the corporation consented, rather than an
order which issued following a hearing on the merits, a definitive answer
to this question cannot now be offered, but must await a subsequent
Commission proceeding. One can only speculate as to how the district
court would have applied the standard of necessity in Mattel li. However, it is possible to raise certain questions which should provide some
substance to the judicial standard of necessity.
Given the expansive ancillary relief calculated to regulate Mattel's
future conduct which was sought and obtained by the Commission,42
the inhibiting effect the permanent injunction was seen as having upon
the future conduct of Mattel, its directors, and its officers may be
questioned. Despite the fact that only Mattel was named as a party
defendant in the proceeding, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 (d)
clearly provides that the injunction would also bind the officers, direcshareholders and made available to those persons who had been Mattel shareholders during the periods in question and who might be in a position to institute private actions
against Mattel to recover any damages suffered as a result of false and misleading financial statements and reports.
40. SEC Litigation Release No. 6467 (Aug. 20, 1974) (SEC v. Mattel, Inc. (D.D.C.
1974)).
41. See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
42. See notes 8-16 supra & accompanying text.
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tors, and employees of Mattel.13 Thus, it appears that the Commission
placed little reliance upon the deterrent effect of the injunction to
ensure future compliance with the relevant provisions of the Exchange
Act, and proceeded to substitute its determination of the appropriate
remedy for the judgment of Congress.

Even assuming the propriety of imposition by the Commission of
safeguards designed to avoid repetition of the allegedly illegal conduct,
the necessity for the sweeping remedy obtained in Mattel H seems

questionable, in light of the injunctive relief provided by the statutes.
One factor which may have motivated the Commission to seek such expansive relief was the fact that five of the six Mattel directors in office at

the time the Commission filed its complaint in Mattel I were "inside directors" of the company. 44 This composition of directors could have led
the Commission to conclude that Mattel's future conduct would parallel
its past behavior. It would seem, however, that this concern could have
been alleviated by the appointment of a single individual unaffiliated
with Mattel, or of independent directors, constituting less than a majority

of the board, to exercise only the powers necessary to monitor Mattel's
financial operations in accordance with the court's order in Mattel I.
The effect of the relief granted in Mattel H was to place complete con-

trol and responsibility for all of Mattel's business operations in the
hands of outsiders who might not be familiar with important aspects
of Mattel's business.
43. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set
forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document,
the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties
to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and
upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d). The court's order reflects the scope of this rule by binding
"Mattel and its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys-in-fact, assigns, and successors." SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,807,
at 96,692 (D.D.C. 1974).
44. See Proxy Statement of Mattel, Inc., Apr. 30, 1974, at 4-7 (hereinafter cited as
Proxy Statement). Two of the nominees for reelection as directors at the 1974 annual
meeting of stockholders were cochairman of the board of directors and chief executive
officer, and president and chief operating officer, respectively. Two other nominees
served as cochairmen of the board and as a consultant to Mattel and a salaried member
of the president's staff, respectively. A fifth nominee also served as a member of the
president's staff, for which he presumably received some form of compensation from
Mattel. The sixth nominee was a partner in a law firm which rendered legal services to
Mattel.
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It is submitted that questions such as those raised above strongly
suggest that the standard of necessity required to justify the granting
of the sweeping ancillary relief provided in Mattel II was not met.
Furthermore, any additional relief for the protection of investors
which may have been obtained as a result of Mattel I must be weighed
against the incursion upon established principles of state corporate law.

State Corporate Law
The Commission's requested ancillary relief in Mattel II entered an
area of corporate law, regulation of the election and removal of directors, which traditionally has been controlled by the states. As a related
matter, the Commission also implicitly assumed the power, previously
within the exclusive province of a corporation's directors or shareholders, to effect an amendment of the corporation's bylaws and to
increase the number of authorized directors. 5
It is a recognized principle of corporate law that the business of a
corporation must be managed by a board of directors 46 elected by the
corporation's shareholders.17 State corporation statutes vest in the shareholders the right to elect directors 4 who serve for the term specified in
the corporation's bylaws; generally, directors are elected at the annual
meeting of shareholders. 9 While the shareholders' right to choose
directors is not exclusive, since applicable statutory, charter, or bylaw
provisions may empower directors to fill vacancies on the board, 50
directors chosen to fill vacant positions are generally appointed for a
term expiring at the next annual meeting of shareholders,5 1 even in the
case of a classified board.5 2 Correlative to the shareholders' reserved
45. See Proxy Statement, supra note 44, at 3 ("Effective at the time and for the

purposes of the Annual Meeting ...the number of directors of Mattel as fixed by the
Board of Directors, pursuant to the By-Laws of the Company, is 6.")
46. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW 5 701
(McKinney 1963). See H. HENN, HA-NDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 5 207 (2d ed.
1970).

47. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 211(b) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 602(b)
(McKinney 1963).
48. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 211(b) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
5 602(b) (McKinney 1963). See H. HENN, supra note 46, §5 188-92.
49. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 141 (a) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 703
(McKinney 1963).
50. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, §5 223(a), (d) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
5 705(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975). See H. HENN, supra note 46, 5 205.
51. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP.LAW 5 705 (c) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
52. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 704(c), 705(c) (McKinney Supp. 1975). Contra, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (b) (Supp. 1974).
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right to elect the members of the board, directors of a corporation may
not take any action designed to perpetuate themselves in office.55
The sweeping relief obtained by the Commission in Mattel II clearly
encroached upon the rights granted to Mattel's shareholders by Delaware, the state of Mattel's incorporation. 54 As a result of the order, a
new majority of directors was installed in office without the benefit of
an informed vote of Mattel's shareholders. 55 Furthermore, it was
highly possible that, under the terms of the court's order in that proceeding, these new directors would remain in office for several years,56
thereby effectively precluding the shareholders from exercising their
right to reelect or replace their directors at each annual meeting.
In addition to usurping the right of Mattel's shareholders to elect
directors, the appointment of the new majority to the Mattel board
and the accompanying requirements that the majority of both the
executive committee and the financial and audit committee, as well as
the entire membership of the litigation and claims committee, be selected from the new directors could be viewed as resulting in the de
facto removal of the incumbent Mattel directors. An amendment to
the Delaware corporation law, effective July 11, 1974, specifically dealt
with the removal of directors,5 7 adopting the previously recognized
common law rule that shareholders have the inherent power to remove
directors for cause. This removal power persists even if directors are
elected cumulatively, as were members of Mattel's board.58 Although
no reported Delaware decision previously had delineated the right of
shareholders to remove without cause a director who had been elected
by cumulative voting, the statutory amendment recognized that right
of removal by limiting the shareholders' ability to remove directors
without cause to a number constituting less than the entire board.59
In the absence of an explicit authorization pursuant to a statute, char53. See, e.g., Silverman v. Gilbert, 185 So. 2d 373 (La. Ct. App. 1966); In re Dollinger
Corp., 51 Misc. 2d 802, 274 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1966).

54. See Proxy Statement, supra note 44, at 2.
55. The proxy rules promulgated by the Commission under section 14 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), applicable to Mattel, are intended to provide shareholders with a certain amount of information concerning new nominees to a board of
directors. See Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
56. See notes 9-16 supra & accompanying text.
57. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (Supp. 1974).
58. Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957), see H. HENN, SuJpra
note 46, § 192.
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (k) (Supp. 1974).
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ter, or bylaw, Mattel's directors could not have been removed by the
shareholders without cause. 60
Although a director may be removed for cause under Delaware law,
some degree of due process must be afforded the aggrieved party. A
director is entitled to formal notice of the grounds upon which he is
to be removed and an opportunity at the corporation's expense to
present a statement in his defense to the shareholders either preceding
or accompanying the corporation's proxy solicitation materials relating
to the removal. 61 A recitation of those acts or omissions which have
been held to constitute "cause" is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, it is sufficient for present purposes to point out that while
under the relevant principles of Delaware corporate law the shareholders of a corporation clearly may remove a director for cause, that
power is circumscribed by due process requirements and may not be
62
exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
The Commission, on the other hand, clearly lacks specific statutory
authority to seek the removal of directors of public corporations which
are subject to the Exchange Act. It likewise lacks a statutory mandate
analogous to Section 36 of the Investment Company Act to prevent
directors of such companies from continuing to act or hold office."
Whether the Commission should be allowed to accomplish indirectly
that which it may not attempt directly is questionable, whether through
the use of a procedure which results in the neutralization of the incumbent directors and facilitates their subordination in the management
of the business to newly-appointed, nonelected outside directors, or
through the de facto removal of the incumbents under circumstances
in which the corporation's shareholders might be unable to exercise
their right of removal.
60. Presumably, a provision in the corporation's charter or bylaws authorizing the
removal by the shareholders without cause of a director elected by cumulative voting
would have been upheld under Delaware law. See Everett v. Transnation Dev. Corp.,
267 A.2d 627 (Del. Ch. 1970). But cf. Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel
Prod., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 93, 159 A.2d 288 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141, Comment

(1974).
61. E.g., Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 575-79, 134 A.2d 852, 859-60 (1957).
A director apparently is entitled to fundamental due process rights despite the fact
that Delaware has no specific statute governing removal procedures and the circumstances
under which removal can be effected. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141, Comment (1974).
62. See Bruch v. National Guarantee Credit Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 180, 186, 116 A. 738, 741

(1922).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970). See notes 28-29 supra & accompanying text.
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Conclusion
It is submitted that, in the absence of the most compelling circumstances, prevailing public policy concepts dictate that questions of intracorporate relationships and responsibilities are subjects to be dealt
with under the laws of the state of incorporation. The broad ancillary
relief granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission in Mattel H
has no express basis in the Exchange Act, or in the legislative history
of that Act. The relief results in significant incursions into areas heretofore thought to be exclusively within the province of state corporate
law. Due to the obvious political questions raised by such incursions, it
is appropriate for Congress to consider whether the Commission should
in fact have the kind of power exercised in Mattel I. Until Congress
does consider this question, the federal courts must deal with the issues
discussed in this article on a case-by-case basis. Because the consent
order procedure does not afford an opportunity to weigh these issues
on their merits, their consideration will depend upon a court which has
the independent determination to inquire into the Commission's authority to exercise the sweeping powers discussed in this article.

